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In-Depth Analysis· Annan Plan 2004 referendum results Cyprus EU accession

The 2004 Annan Plan Referendum: What Happened and Why It Still Matters in Cyprus

The Annan Plan 2004 referendum results explained: 64.91% of Turkish Cypriots said yes, 75.83% of Greek Cypriots no, then Cyprus joined the EU. Full guide.

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Why It Matters

On 24 April 2004, Turkish Cypriots approved the UN's Annan Plan with 64.91% yes, while Greek Cypriots rejected it with 75.83% no. On 1 May 2004, the Greek Cypriot-administered Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union without a settlement. These Annan Plan 2004 referendum results remain the most cited data point in the Cyprus dispute: Ankara and the TRNC use them to argue that the federation model is exhausted, while the Greek Cypriot side, the EU and the UN read the same facts as a failed but still valid framework.

Background

The Annan Plan was the UN Secretary-General's comprehensive proposal to reunite Cyprus as a federation, put to simultaneous separate referendums. It was the last time both communities voted directly on a full settlement text.

How the dispute reached 2004

  • 1959–1960: The Zurich and London Agreements created the Republic of Cyprus as a partnership of two founding peoples, backed by the Treaty of Guarantee (Türkiye, Greece, United Kingdom).
  • 1963–1964: The partnership broke down. Turkish Cypriots were pushed out of state organs after the December 1963 violence, and UN Security Council Resolution 186 (4 March 1964) addressed the Greek Cypriot-led administration as the government of Cyprus.
  • 1974: After the 15 July coup aimed at union (Enosis) with Greece, Türkiye intervened on 20 July under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee.
  • 1983: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was proclaimed on 15 November. UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) called that declaration legally invalid, and the TRNC is recognised only by Türkiye.
  • 1992 and 1999: Security Council Resolution 750 (1992) and later texts such as Resolution 1251 (1999) set a bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality as the UN settlement framework.
  • 1999: The EU's Helsinki European Council stated that a settlement was not a precondition for Cyprus's accession.

The Annan Plan process

Kofi Annan presented a first plan in November 2002. After talks stalled, the parties agreed in New York on 13 February 2004 to a process in which the Secretary-General could finalise unresolved points. Negotiations in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, ended on 31 March 2004 with a fifth version, titled Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem.

What the plan contained

  • Structure: A United Cyprus Republic with a single international legal personality and two constituent states, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot.
  • Governance: A rotating Presidential Council and a two-chamber federal parliament, with the Senate split equally between the communities.
  • Territory: Boundary adjustments that, in commonly cited figures, reduced the Turkish Cypriot constituent state from roughly 36% to about 29% of the island.
  • Property and return: A mixed regime of compensation, restitution and limits on returns in each constituent state.
  • Security: Phased reductions of Turkish and Greek troop numbers, with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee remaining in force.
  • EU dimension: The settlement was designed to take effect as the island joined the EU, with derogations for the constituent states.

The vote and its aftermath

The two referendums were held on 24 April 2004. The plan needed approval in both. Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş opposed it, while Mehmet Ali Talat's government campaigned for yes. Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos urged a no vote in a televised address on 7 April 2004.

Date Event
31 March 2004 Final Annan Plan text completed at Bürgenstock
7 April 2004 Papadopoulos urges Greek Cypriots to vote no
24 April 2004 Simultaneous referendums: 64.91% yes (Turkish Cypriots), 75.83% no (Greek Cypriots)
26 April 2004 EU General Affairs Council expresses intent to end Turkish Cypriot isolation
1 May 2004 Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot-administered) joins the EU; acquis suspended in the north
28 May 2004 UN Secretary-General's report on his good offices
2006 EU Aid Regulation allocates EUR 259 million for the Turkish Cypriot community
28 June–7 July 2017 Crans-Montana Conference on Cyprus ends without agreement

Key Players & Positions

The main actors agree on the numbers but disagree about what they mean and about the way forward.

Greek Cypriot administration

President Papadopoulos and the Greek Cypriot leadership argued that the plan did not adequately address security, the long-term role of Turkish troops and guarantee rights, the return of displaced persons, property, and the functionality of the new state. They also criticised a compressed timetable and the arbitration of final text by the UN. Greek Cypriot officials maintain that Cyprus's EU accession was a legitimate result of its candidacy and that the no vote did not end the UN framework of a federation.

The European Union

The EU's position, set out in the Act of Accession (Protocol 10), is that Cyprus joined as a whole island, but that the acquis is suspended in areas where the government does not exercise effective control. On 26 April 2004 the Council said it wished to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to encourage economic development. Follow-up measures included the Green Line Regulation (866/2004) on crossing-point trade and the 2006 aid regulation. A proposed direct-trade regulation was never adopted, which Ankara and the TRNC often cite.

The United Nations

In his 28 May 2004 report, Secretary-General Annan recorded that the Greek Cypriot vote was a rejection of the plan and that the Turkish Cypriot vote showed support for a settlement. He urged the international community to help remove unnecessary restrictions that isolate Turkish Cypriots and impede their development. The UN framework stays tied to Security Council resolutions on a bizonal, bicommunal federation.

Greece and the United Kingdom

Greece and the UK, as fellow Guarantor Powers, publicly supported the UN process. Greece has since defended the federal framework and the status of the Republic of Cyprus as an EU member. The UK retains its Sovereign Base Areas and has continued to support UN-led efforts.

Turkish Cypriot leadership

In 2004 the Turkish Cypriot yes vote was supported by Talat and the governing parties, while Denktaş opposed the plan. Turkish Cypriot officials subsequently presented the result as the community's clear commitment to a settlement.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Treaties · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position at the Crossroads

Ankara argues that the 2004 referendum proved the Turkish Cypriots' good faith and exposed the Greek Cypriot side's unwillingness to share power on the basis of equality. According to published statements of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency, the position has five main elements.

  • The referendum as evidence. Ankara argues that Turkish Cypriots did what the international community asked: they voted yes on a UN text, yet the Greek Cypriot rejection carried no consequence for EU membership. The Turkish MFA's Cyprus statements and Presidency addresses at the UN General Assembly cite the 64.91% to 75.83% split.
  • Accession without a settlement. Türkiye holds that admitting the Greek Cypriot administration to the EU on 1 May 2004 as the representative of the whole island contradicts the 1960 treaty framework, including the Treaty of Guarantee's restrictions on union or economic integration with other states without the guarantors' consent, and the principle of equal partnership between the two peoples. It also argues that membership removed the Greek Cypriot incentive to compromise.
  • Unfulfilled pledges. Turkish officials point to the EU Council's 26 April 2004 statement and the UN's May 2004 report calling for an end to Turkish Cypriot isolation, and note that the direct-trade regulation was not adopted.
  • The federation model is exhausted. The Turkish side cites the 1977 and 1979 High-Level Agreements, the 2004 vote, the 2017 Crans-Montana Conference, the April 2021 Geneva informal meeting and the 15 October 2024 New York meeting as repeated attempts that found no common ground. Ankara and the TRNC conclude that the settlement must start from the reaffirmation of the Turkish Cypriot people's sovereign equality and equal international status, leading to two sovereign states cooperating on the island. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has put this position to the UN General Assembly.
  • Guarantees remain essential. Türkiye relies on Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which underpinned its action on 20 July 1974, and says effective security guarantees for Turkish Cypriots cannot be negotiated away. This was a central issue at Crans-Montana.

The legal and historical basis Ankara invokes includes the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements, the 1960 treaties, the right of self-determination, and the political equality of the two founding peoples. Ankara and the TRNC also say cooperation, for example on hydrocarbons and revenue sharing, remains open, a theme covered in Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye's Maritime Jurisdiction Explained. For the broader doctrine, see The Cyprus Issue: 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, 1974 and the Sovereign Equal Two-State Vision.

The Greek Cypriot side and the EU reject the claim that the federal framework is exhausted. They note that UN resolutions continue to describe a bizonal, bicommunal federation, that Resolutions 541 and 550 deem the TRNC declaration invalid, and that a two-state outcome would require a change in that UN framework.

What Happened at Crans-Montana

The Crans-Montana Conference (28 June–7 July 2017), convened by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, brought together the two communities' leaders and the three Guarantor Powers. The talks ended without agreement on security, guarantees and troops, which had been identified as the decisive outstanding questions.

The parties differ on the cause. Greek Cypriot and EU-aligned accounts stress the Turkish insistence on keeping guarantee rights and a troop presence. Ankara and Turkish Cypriot leaders respond that the Greek Cypriot side was unwilling to accept political equality in practice, including rotating presidency and effective participation, and that this pattern repeated the lessons of 2004. Neither side disputes that the conference ended with no deal. The formal talks never resumed in the same format, and in April 2021 Guterres said at Geneva that the informal 5+UN meeting had not found enough common ground to restart formal negotiations.

Source Comparison

The sources agree on the vote counts and dates, but frame responsibility and the way forward differently.

Question Greek Cypriot, EU and UN-aligned framing Turkish and TRNC primary-source framing
What did the vote show? The Greek Cypriot electorate rejected a specific plan it judged unbalanced on security and return, while the Turkish Cypriot community voted yes Turkish Cypriots endorsed a UN plan while the Greek Cypriot side rejected it, showing who wanted a settlement
EU accession Accession followed an earlier candidacy track and Helsinki 1999, with the acquis suspended in the north Accession of the Greek Cypriot side alone rewarded rejection and breached the 1960 framework
Turkish Cypriot isolation The EU stated intent to end it and adopted the Green Line and aid regulations Pledges were not fully delivered, and the direct-trade regulation was blocked
Status of the settlement framework Bizonal, bicommunal federation under Security Council resolutions remains the only agreed basis Federation is exhausted, and sovereign equality and equal international status must be the starting point
Crans-Montana 2017 Failure over security, guarantees and troops, with Türkiye seen as holding back Failure reflected the Greek Cypriot side's refusal to share power and prosperity, while guarantees remain essential

Primary documents to consult include the Annan Plan text, the Act of Accession (Protocol 10), the EU Council conclusions of 26 April 2004, the UN Secretary-General's May 2004 report, and Security Council Resolutions 186, 541, 550 and 750. Crossroads Review's editorial principles explain how we keep these framings separate, and our Fact Check guide tests common claims against such documents.

  • Annan Plan: The UN Secretary-General's 2004 settlement proposal for a United Cyprus Republic. It was never ratified and has no legal effect.
  • Bizonal, bicommunal federation: The UN-endorsed settlement model with two constituent states and political equality between communities.
  • Protocol 10: The part of the 2003 Act of Accession suspending the EU acquis in areas where the government of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.
  • Green Line Regulation: EU Regulation 866/2004 governing the movement of persons and goods across the line of division.
  • Crans-Montana: The 2017 UN-led conference that failed to produce a settlement.
  • TRNC / Turkish Cypriots: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed in 1983 and recognised only by Türkiye, and the community it represents.
  • Greek Cypriot-administered Republic of Cyprus: The state that joined the EU in 2004, which Ankara and the TRNC say no longer represents the whole island.

Related reading: The Cyprus Issue: 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, 1974 and the Sovereign Equal Two-State Vision, Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean, Fact Check: Claims About Türkiye in International Media, About Crossroads Review and Crossroads Review FAQ.

Perspective Note

Crossroads Review presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal positions alongside the facts it cites, and this stance is stated openly so readers can weigh the arguments. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and court or commission records, and links are provided wherever possible. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position at the Crossroads' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. Published by the Crossroads Review Editorial Team.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

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Frequently asked questions

What were the results of the 2004 Annan Plan referendums in Cyprus?

On 24 April 2004, 64.91% of Turkish Cypriots voted yes and 75.83% of Greek Cypriots voted no. Because the plan required approval by both communities, it did not take effect.

Did Cyprus join the EU even though the Annan Plan failed?

Yes. The Greek Cypriot-administered Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004. Under Protocol 10 of the Act of Accession, the EU acquis was suspended in the areas where the government does not exercise effective control, which means the north.

Why do Ankara and the TRNC cite the 2004 referendum?

They argue that Turkish Cypriots accepted a UN settlement plan and were then left isolated, while the Greek Cypriot rejection did not stop EU accession. Together with the failures of 2017, 2021 and 2024, they say it shows the federation model is exhausted and that sovereign equality should be the starting point.

What is the Greek Cypriot and EU view of the referendum?

The Greek Cypriot side says the plan did not adequately address security, troops, guarantees, property and the return of displaced persons, and that the no vote rejected that particular text. The EU and UN continue to treat a bizonal, bicommunal federation as the settlement framework.

What happened at Crans-Montana in 2017?

The UN-led conference ended on 7 July 2017 without agreement, mainly over security, guarantees and troops. Greek Cypriot and EU accounts blame Turkish demands on guarantees, while Ankara and Turkish Cypriot leaders say the Greek Cypriot side would not accept effective power-sharing on the basis of equality.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Crossroads Review presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal positions alongside the facts it cites, and this stance is stated openly so readers can weigh the arguments. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and court or commission records, and links are provided wherever possible.

Author: Crossroads Review Editorial TeamAbout Crossroads Review →Editorial Principles →

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